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INTRODUCTION 
Safety at live event and music festival venues has become a matter 
of increasing concern in recent years. Concerts end abruptly and are 
evacuated due to security concerns, such as bomb threats.1 Security 
checkpoints including metal detector wands and bag searches create 
bottlenecked crowds as attendees express concerns about the number of 
security personnel available.2 Concert promoters and venue owners try to 
find a balance between keeping concert expenses low while trying to train 
security personnel and secure multiple building entrances.3 Artists cancel 
meet and greets with fans due to security concerns.4 Large venues install 
greater security measures, such as metal detectors, and raise ticket surcharges 
while smaller venues weigh the costs of installing security devices versus the 
risk of violence when the crowd numbers are in the low hundreds or mainly 
consist of young teenagers.5 As concert attendance numbers grow and 
concert security issues become evident and more frequent, how can event 
venue owners and promoters keep attendees and performers safe in a uniform 
manner?   
This Note offers state legislatures a proposed model venue security 
act that addresses safety issues arising from venue violence. Part I of the Note 
addresses the problem of violence within event venues and festivals and 
common concerns highlighted by such incidents, such as artist safety, event 
attendee safety, and crowd safety during evacuations. Part I also examines 
the emergence of tort actions by concert attendees against venue owners and 
 
1. See Indiana Police Say Bomb Threat Halted Rascal Flatts Concert, AP NEWS (Aug. 
14, 2018), https://apnews.com/74c80c525d8941c49e5b7d94fd6e4e4f [https://perma.cc/F9HJ-
4GKQ]; David Lindquist, What Prompted ‘Safety Concern’ and Abrupt End to Rascal Flatts 
Show Remains Unclear, INDYSTAR (Aug. 10 2018, 1:13 AM), https://www.indystar.com/
story/entertainment/music/2018/08/10/abrupt-end-rascal-flatts-concert-leaves-indiana-fans-
puzzled/954328002/ [https://perma.cc/RQ3H-JZCR]; Variety Staff, The Roots’ SXSW 
Concert Canceled Due to ‘Security Concern’, VARIETY (Mar. 17, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://
variety.com/2018/music/news/the-roots-sxsw-concert-cancelled-due-to-security-concern-
1202729636/ [https://perma.cc/9QJW-MFBE]. 
2. See Concert Goers Wait in Lengthy Lines Before Beyonce & Jay-Z Show, NEWS 
CHANNEL 5 NETWORK (Aug. 23, 2018, 9:42 PM), https://www.newschannel5.com/news/
concert-goers-wait-in-lengthy-lines-before-beyonce-jay-z-show [https://perma.cc/U89Z-
3SCG]. 
3. See Ray Waddell, Security Experts on the ‘New Normal’: Challenges and Logistics 
of Concert Safety in the Wake of Orlando Shootings, BILLBOARD (June 14, 2016), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/7407926/security-experts-new-normal-challenges-
and-logistics-concert-safety [https://perma.cc/D9TG-JHU9]. 
4. See Jason Chervokas & Vanessa Wilkins, Justin Bieber Cancels Tour Meet-and-
Greets, ABC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2016, 2:20 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/justin-
bieber-cancels-tour-meet-greets/story?id=37866933 [https://perma.cc/8PDN-KW22]. 
5. See Ben Sisario, New Reality After Orlando Attacks: Dogs, Metal Detectors and 
Searches at Public Gatherings, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
06/14/us/new-reality-after-orlando-attacks-dogs-metal-detectors-and-searches-at-public-
gatherings.html [https://perma.cc/8AYU-DDCL]. 
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promoters in the wake of violent incidents. Part II of the Note examines the 
current state of event security legislation, event safety suggested guidelines 
from the Event Safety Alliance and the Events Industry Forum, and the ways 
in which existing legislation fails to adequately prepare event venue owners 
and promoters to provide sufficient security measures. Part III of the Note 
explores the manner in which a major venue fire shaped legislation and 
regulations in Rhode Island and Massachusetts as to fire safety, providing a 
useful illustration of how legislation can address safety issues connected with 
acts of violence. Part IV presents model legislation aimed to better regulate 
venue security and to address associated liability issues. Finally, Part V 
addresses the reasoning behind the model legislation. 
I.   RECENT VIOLENT INCIDENTS AT EVENT VENUES AND TORT 
LIABILITY 
Recent violent incidents at venues and the crowd panic after 
perceived danger at live events demonstrate how unpreparedness for 
potential violence can cause unnecessary loss of life and injuries. Violent 
incidents at venues have already raised questions of whether venue owners 
and promoters should face tort liability. As more violence against artists and 
attendees at live events occurs, such incidents will become even more 
reasonably foreseeable and could continue to open up venue owners and 
promoters to tort liability.  
A.  Recent Violent Incidents at Event Venues 
Incidents of violence or close calls at events highlight the need for 
standard security regulations to preserve artist and fan safety and, in cases 
where violence still occurs, to lessen injuries or casualties. For example, 
increased interactions between artists and their audiences stir questions 
regarding how to protect artists from individuals who wish to cause them 
harm rather than ask for an autograph. Meet-and-greets with fans have 
become a booming source of revenue for touring artists. They can bring in 
revenues often “50 percent to 100 percent higher than the face value of a 
ticket,” sometimes more when tied to sponsorship agreements, even for 
established artists; meet-and-greets can be particularly helpful for emerging 
artists trying to build or expand their fan bases.6 The experiences, such as 
photo opportunities or private performances, build upon the social media-
fueled perception that artists should be easily accessible to fans.7 However, 
as meet and greets with fans become more frequent, more questions arise as 
 
6. Ray Waddell, Meet-and-Greets and Close Fan Interactions, a Financial Necessity 
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to how promoters and venue owners can ensure that artists remain safe during 
up-close and personal interactions with their fans, particularly in small 
venues with small budgets and small staff numbers.8  
On Friday, June 10, 2016, musician Christina Grimmie performed at 
the Plaza Live theater in Orlando, Florida in front of a crowd of 
approximately 300 concert attendees.9 After the concert, as she signed 
autographs during a meet-and-greet, a member of the crowd that she did not 
know shot her twice, killing her; he then shot and killed himself after Ms. 
Grimmie’s brother tackled him.10 Police later discovered that her killer 
brought two pistols, two magazines, and a hunting knife into the venue. 
Although the venue searched arriving concert attendees with metal detectors 
or wands at most other events, only bag searches were in place on the night 
of Ms. Grimmie’s murder.11 Also, although signs posted outside of the venue 
stated that no weapons were allowed inside, the promoter, AEG, and the 
venue, which was owned by the Orlando Philharmonic Orchestra Plaza 
Foundation, did not have more intense screening measures in place the night 
of Ms. Grimmie’s murder because “the concert was mostly attended by 
teenage girls.”12  
Ms. Grimmie’s family filed a wrongful death lawsuit against both 
AEG and the Orlando Philharmonic Orchestra Plaza Foundation, alleging 
that they neglected to have adequate security onsite. Her family sought to 
recover medical and funeral expenses, damages, and Ms. Grimmie’s 
estimated lifetime earnings.13 Although AEG filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that it did not promote Ms. Grimmie’s entire tour and that the venue 
was instead responsible for the security issues, a circuit court judge denied 
the motion in April 2018 and noted that “AEG Live contractually shared the 
management and control of the concert, including security,” with the venue 
owner, and that numerous facts, when taken as true, supported the “existence 
of a special relationship between AEG Live and [Ms. Grimmie].”14 The 
parties attempted mediation in September 2019. The court never ruled upon 
 
8. See Waddell, supra note 3, at 1; see also Steve Knopper, ‘No One Wants to Die on 
Tour.’ Inside the State of Concert Security, ROLLING STONE (June 22, 2016, 3:48 PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/no-one-wants-to-die-on-tour-inside-the-
state-of-concert-security-226042/ [https://perma.cc/KDF8-479W]. 
9. Patrick Ryan, In Wake of Orlando Shootings, Venue Safety Comes Into Question, 
USA TODAY (June 12, 2016, 6:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/
2016/06/12/christina-grimmie-orlando-shootings/85788334/ [https://perma.cc/D9H9-5HFB]. 
10. Michael Williams, Venue, Concert Promoter Ask Judge to Toss Lawsuit in Singer 





13. Tina Amendola, Judge Rejects AEG Lawsuit Dismissal in Christina Grimmie’s 
Death, POLLSTAR (Apr. 10, 2018, 9:35 AM), https://www.pollstar.com/article/judge-rejects-
aeg-lawsuit-dismissal-in-christina-grimmies-death-135024 [https://perma.cc/2JVV-VUFC]. 
14. Id. 
444 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:440 
the Orlando Philharmonic Orchestra Plaza Foundation’s Motion for Final 
Summary Judgment because on December 3, 2019, Ms. Grimmie’s family 
filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice as to both AEG Live 
and the Orlando Philharmonic Orchestra Plaza Foundation.15  
The shooting drew comparisons to the murder of guitarist 
“Dimebag” Darrell Abbott, who was shot and killed onstage on December 8, 
2004, in Columbus, Ohio at the Alrosa Villa Nightclub.16 The venue only had 
250 fans in attendance, well below the venue’s capacity of 600.17 The 
shooter, who stood outside while the opening bands played and had been told 
to leave the venue’s parking lot by a venue employee earlier in the night, 
quickly entered the club through an unsecured side door. He then shot and 
killed Mr. Abbot, a member of the crowd, a band crew member, and a venue 
employee.18 Mr. Abbott’s family filed a lawsuit against the Alrosa Villa 
Nightclub and alleged that the security team should have anticipated the 
shooter’s dangerous behavior before he got inside the venue. The parties 
settled in 2007 on “undisclosed terms.”19 Even before the murder of Ms. 
Grimmie and Mr. Abbott, music industry professionals worried that security, 
especially in small venues with low budgets, was too lax, allowing for venues 
to hire minimal security staff members or overenthusiastic fans to sneak 
backstage.20 The deaths of both Ms. Grimmie and Mr. Abbott demonstrate 
the importance of venue security even at events with small numbers of 
attendees or mainly young fans in attendance. 
As concerns grow regarding safety protocol for venues, those 
involved in the music festival industry also face concerns regarding violence 
and safety.21 The music festival industry is worth approximately three billion 
dollars worldwide.22 In 2014, 32 million people attended at least one music 
 
15. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice, Grimmie v. AEG Live SE, 
No. 2016-CA-011056-O (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2019). 
16. Miriam Coleman, Pantera Calls for Better Artist Protection After Christina 
Grimmie Shooting, ROLLING STONE (June 12, 2016, 5:14 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/
music/music-news/pantera-calls-for-better-artist-protection-after-christina-grimmie-shooting
-104558/ [https://perma.cc/C9AL-GBNC]; Peter Wilkinson, Behind the Murder of ‘Dimebag’ 
Darrell, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 30, 2004, 5:30 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/
music-news/behind-the-murder-of-dimebag-darrell-233541/ [https://perma.cc/4PHC-LPK3]. 
17. Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 5. 
18. Id. 
19. Steve Knopper, Are Concert Venues Any Safer After Dimebag Darrell’s Murder?, 
ROLLING STONE (Dec. 8, 2014, 3:49 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-
news/are-concert-venues-any-safer-after-dimebag-darrells-murder-76676/ 
[https://perma.cc/UDG5-WV6T].  
20. See id. 
21. See Luke O’Neil, What Can Music Promoters Do About Concert and Festival Safety 
After the Las Vegas Massacre?, ESQUIRE (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.esquire.com/
entertainment/music/a12771114/music-festival-concert-safety-after-las-vegas/ [https://perma
.cc/WX5F-TDQ4]. 
22. Music Festivals: What’s the World’s Biggest?, BBC (July 4, 2018), https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-44697302 [https://perma.cc/748Q-H9AL]. 
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festival in the United States.23 However, as festival attendance numbers 
grow, music festival promoters have become increasingly concerned about 
how to keep attendees and artists safe from security risks, particularly in 
festival sites within urban areas, surrounded by threats from “well beyond 
the traditional security perimeter of the event itself.”24 In the unfortunate 
event of a violent incident that is unable to be prevented, unclear evacuation 
procedures and inadequately trained security staff can cause more harm to 
attendees as they attempt to leave an unsafe area or seek shelter.  
On Sunday, October 1, 2017, over 20,000 people attended the third 
and final day of the Route 91 Harvest Festival, a country music festival 
located “on 15 open acres in the middle of the Las Vegas skyline.”25 The 
festival, promoted by Live Nation, was in its fourth year, and the 2017 edition 
had not had any major issues on Friday and Saturday.26 During Jason 
Aldean’s set, the closing act of the night, a man fired shots from the thirty-
second floor of the adjacent Mandalay Bay Hotel down onto unsuspecting 
festival attendees.27 It became the deadliest shooting in modern United States 
history, with fifty-nine people killed and 527 people injured.28 Victims, their 
family members, and even a few security guards who had worked at the 
festival filed multiple lawsuits against Live Nation, the festival promoter, 
alleging that the festival lacked both “adequate exits” and “properly trained 
employees for when the crowd began trying to evacuate, resulting in 
additional injuries and exposure to the gunman’s fire.”29  
The aerial assault led to other open-air festivals held in cities to 
reassess their security standards, and security professionals began to call for 
“expanding the perimeter around so-called soft targets, and for increased 
 
23. Joe Lynch, Check Out These Surprising Stats About U.S. Music Festivals, 
BILLBOARD (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/music-festivals/
6539009/music-festival-statistics-graphic [https://perma.cc/MN2J-89PA]. 
24. See O’Neil, supra note 21, at 6. 
25. Avi Selk & Amy B. Wang, Route 91 Harvest Festival: The Las Vegas ‘Sleepover’ 
That Ended in a Nightmare, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2017/10/02/route-91-harvest-festival-the-las-vegas-sleep
over-that-ended-in-a-nightmare/ [https://perma.cc/8D8E-P7MP]. 
26. Gil Kaufman, A Brief History of the Route 91 Harvest Festival, BILLBOARD (Oct. 2, 
2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/country/7981988/route-91-harvest- 
festival-history [https://perma.cc/V2X7-9AZN]. 
27. Daniel Kreps, Las Vegas Shooting: At Least 59 Dead at Route 91 Music Festival, 
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 2, 2017, 1:09 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-country/
las-vegas-shooting-at-least-59-dead-at-route-91-music-festival-122293/ [https://perma.cc/YB
6L-9479]. 
28. Karma Allen, Emily Shapiro & Julia Jacobo, Las Vegas Shooting Death Toll Rises 
to 50, No Apparent Connection to International Terror, ABC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2017, 3:19 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/las-vegas-shooting-death-toll-rises-59-apparent/story?id=50223
240 [https://perma.cc/XD8P-4A83]. 
29. Matt Pearce, Mandalay Bay and Concert Promoter Sued by Hundreds of Las Vegas 
Massacre Survivors, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
vegas-lawsuits-20171120-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z3GT-8G5T]. 
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coordination between venues and neighboring businesses.”30 Event 
organizers and security professionals behind the Austin City Limits Festival, 
which took place with 75,000 attendees in Zilker Park in Austin, Texas, the 
weekend after the Route 91 Harvest Festival shooting, offered refunds to 
ticket buyers who were concerned about safety and had police officers visit 
condominiums bordering the festival site.31 Chris Robinette, the president of 
Prevent Advisors, a security advising company, stated that adjusting security 
to deal with potential aerial threats is “a dynamic process that requires 
promoters, venue managers, local authorities and other stakeholders to work 
together.”32  
Nearly a year after the attack on the Route 91 Harvest Festival, panic 
erupted on the other side of the country when attendees at the Global Citizen 
Festival in New York City, held in Central Park, heard a loud popping noise. 
Although police initially thought the source of the noise was a fallen fence 
barrier, they later determined that two attendees had gotten into a fight; as 
the crowd shifted away from the fight, concert attendees stepped on water 
bottles on the ground and at least one burst, which caused the loud popping 
noise.33 There were 100 police officers covering the event who had studied 
shootings and conducted drills for such situations. The Assistant Chief of the 
NYPD implored attendees to “remain calm” after the sound rang out and 
police quickly determined that no shots had been fired. Police even brought 
Chris Martin, the frontman of the band Coldplay, onstage to implore the 
crowd to remain claim and notify them that no shots had been fired.34 
However, attendees began running towards exits, knocking over barriers as 
they ran while some individuals yelled, “Shooter!” Police officers in the 
crowd were reported to have told fleeing attendees to duck.35  
Although police calmed the crowd within minutes and no major 
injuries occurred, over thirty-seven people suffered minor injuries during the 
stampede. Attendees later complained about the lack of signage and surplus 
of barricades that made evacuation difficult, as well as the lack of clear 
communication about what was actually happening. Festival organizers 
eventually apologized for the confusing and dangerous situation and were 
left wondering what could have been done differently to better prepare for an 
 
30. Reggie Ugwu & Joe Coscarelli, ‘There Is No Manual for This’: Security Experts 




33. Sarah Mervosh, Noise at Festival Was Not Gunfire, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/29/nyregion/central-park-panic-global-citizen-
festival.html [https://perma.cc/KRE8-85J7]; Ashley Southall & Ali Winston, Noise Wasn’t 
Gunfire, but Crowd’s Panic Was Real, and Dangerous, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/nyregion/central-park-concert-stampede.html [https://
perma.cc/RX4V-8ZX4]. 
34. Southall & Winston, supra note 33, at 8. 
35. Id. 
2020] VENUE SAFETY AND LIABILITY 447 
evacuation and how to prevent a dangerous mob of fleeing attendees which, 
in this situation, was more dangerous to the crowd than the source of the 
panic-inducing noise.36 At a time when instances of actual violence at venues 
and major events dominate the headlines, how can event organizers ensure 
the safety of evacuating attendees when the public is likely to assume the 
worst possible scenario in instances of apparent danger? 
B. Tort Actions Against Venue Owners and Promoters 
Violent incidents often leave courts to deal with the confusion of 
which party related to the event should actually be held liable. Many states 
have premise liability acts that limit a property owner’s liability to occasions 
when a danger could have been reasonably foreseen.37 Generally, under 
premises liability law, concert attendees are invitees to whom venue owners 
owe a duty of reasonable care.38 However, a venue owner only has a duty to 
protect attendees from criminal assault or violence if such an intentional or 
criminal act by a third party was “reasonably foreseeable.”39 For example, in 
Smit v. SXSW Holdings, Inc, the family of a 2014 SXSW festival attendee 
sued the festival organizers and the City of Austin in an action that included 
allegations of negligence and premises liability after an intoxicated driver 
knowingly sped through a closed city street while attempting to escape from 
police, striking and killing the attendee.40 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim 
under state law.41 The court determined that the attendee’s family made no 
sufficient allegation that the SXSW defendants maintained control of the city 
street where the incident took place. Although the city granted the SXSW 
defendants a permit to temporarily legally occupy the street, the permit was 
insufficient to give SXSW sufficient control to be liable for negligence and 
premises liability. In Texas, both of these causes of action require existence 
of “control of the premises,” but the duty “does not extend beyond the limit 
 
36. Id. 
37. See Jennifer Medina and Jess Bidgood, Uphill Battles in Court in Wake of Killing 
Spree, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/us/lawsuits-las-
vegas-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/G3MP-FF2P] (“In Colorado, the Premises Liability 
Act generally limits landowners from responsibility for dangers on their property that they 
could not reasonably have foreseen.”); see also Marrero v. City of New York, 958 N.Y.S.2d 
51, 52 (2013) (affirming the dismissal of a concert attendee’s claim against a concert promoter 
after an unidentified attendee shoved the plaintiff. The court noted the unidentified party’s 
causing the plaintiff to fall constituted “unforeseen conduct.”). 
38. 2 THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 10:36 (3d ed. 2018) (citing Rotz 
v. City of New York, 532 N.Y.S.2d 245, 248 (1988)); Thomas v. Illinois, 55 Ill. Ct. Cl. 337 
(2003)). 
39. Florman v. City of New York, 293 A.D.2d 120, 124–25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); see 
generally Selz, supra note 38. 
40. Smit v. SXSW Holdings, Inc., 903 F.3d 522, 525–27 (5th Cir. 2018).  
41. Id. at 525. 
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of the premises owner’s control.”42 The issuance of a temporary legal 
occupancy permit alone is insufficient.43 The court then upheld the dismissal 
of the negligence and premises liability claim against the city, holding that 
the driver’s conduct “was not reasonably foreseen under Texas law,” noting 
that the owner of the premises only has a duty to prevent “third-party crime” 
if he or she “knows or has reason to know of an unreasonable and foreseeable 
risk of harm to the invitee” and that previous incidents involving intoxicated 
drivers in the area were not “sufficiently similar to the crime in question as 
to place the landowner on notice of the specific danger.”44  
In Maheshwari v. City of New York, a 2004 case where several 
unidentified men assaulted an International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness pamphlet distributor in a parking lot on a music festival site, 
the Court of Appeals of New York noted that “[a] random criminal attack of 
this nature is not a predictable result of the gathering of a large group of 
people.”45 In contrast, in Martens v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois 
University, the Court of Claims of Illinois held that a venue owner failed to 
use “reasonable care” to protect a concert attendee from the dangerous 
actions of a third-party individual after an unidentified person set off a signal 
flare that struck and injured the attendee’s face at an outdoor concert.46 The 
court first asked whether the situation constituted a “known, dangerous 
condition,” whether the venue had reason to believe that the attendee would 
fail to protect herself from the danger, and whether the venue owner used 
“reasonable care” to protect the attendee from the actions of the third party.47 
The court noted that once fireworks began to be set off by unidentified 
individuals in the crowd, there were “no public address requests that the 
fireworks cease, nor were there any signs or warnings in evidence anywhere 
prohibiting or referring in any way to fireworks.”48 
The state of Illinois had legislation in place to prohibit the use of 
such fireworks and projectiles at the time of the attendee’s injury; the court 
noted that such legislation “evidences a clear legislative expression that 
lighted, exploding, and flying objects are dangerous to the public.”49 The 
court also held that the presence of “between 200 and 250 ushers and regular 
security people on duty the night of the incident” gave the attendee “every 
reason to believe” that venue staff and security were in place “for her 
protection and would take necessary steps to eliminate any dangerous 
 
42. Id. at 527–28 (citing Dixon v. Hous. Raceway Park, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1994)).  
43. Smit, 903 F.3d at 528. 
44. Id. at 530–32 (citing Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 
749, 757 (Tex. 1998)). 
45. Maheshwari v. City of New York, 810 N.E.2d 894, 896–98 (N.Y. 2004). 
46. Martens v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 80, 82–85 (1981). 
47. Id. at 84. 
48. Id. at 81. 
49. Id. at 84. 
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situation–especially a situation which was prohibited by State law.”50 Finally, 
trial testimony established that the launching of fireworks or projectiles had 
been a common trend at concerts hosted at the venue in question, so the venue 
owner “should have been aware of the dangerous situation.” Therefore, the 
venue owner breached a duty to the attendee to protect against the “negligent 
or criminal” actions of a third party because the venue owner had knowledge 
of previous incidents involving fireworks within the venue and therefore had 
knowledge of the danger and a duty to anticipate it.51  
A concert promoter can also potentially face tort liability after a 
third-party’s act of violence at an event. For example, in Jones v. Live Nation 
Entertainment, Inc., the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed a lower court’s 
granting of summary judgment in favor of a concert promoter and remanded 
for consideration of whether the defendant, concert promoter Live Nation, 
owed the plaintiff, a concert attendee, a duty of care.52 The attendee suffered 
injuries after falling during a “crowd surge” as other attendees attempted to 
rush towards the stage after being encouraged to do so by the performers 
onstage, and the attendee alleged that the promoter “acted in a reckless and 
careless manner without regard for the safety of their audience when they 
knew or should have known that any movement by a majority of their 
audience at the same time in the same direction would create a hazard.”53 The 
court noted that the trial court abused its discretion by granting summary 
judgment because an issue of material fact remained regarding whether Live 
Nation had a duty of care towards the injured attendee.54 Although Live 
Nation and the venue owner had a rental agreement which split up obligations 
regarding security, crowd control, and other details of the concert, the court 
noted that the attendee was not a party to that agreement and, therefore, the 
agreement could not be used “to determine plaintiff’s rights.” The court also 
noted that the plaintiff “was invited by Live Nation to a Live Nation-
promoted event, which featured two artists that Live Nation placed in 
performance” and therefore had a separate relationship with Live Nation 
while on premises leased or licensed to Live Nation.55 In addition to live 
event attendees, promoters may also be liable to artists who are harmed 
during a violent incident.56 
As the number of violent incidents at live events continues to grow, 
it is likely to become increasingly difficult for event venue owners to argue 
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56. See, e.g., Amendola supra note 13, at 4 (describing how a circuit court judge refused 
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the unforeseeable nature of such incidents.57 Implementation of standardized 
venue security measures gives venue owners and promoters a clear sense of 
what steps they must take to properly secure an event and, in the unfortunate 
case of a security incident, would protect venue owners and promoters from 
liability if they followed the security measures. For example, in Villa v. 
Paradise Theater Productions, Inc., a concert attendee sought damages from 
a concert promoter and venue owner after another individual assaulted the 
attendee at a concert.58 After the promoter and venue owner presented 
evidence that they had security measures in place the night of the concert, 
including “the provision of security guards, metal detectors, handheld metal 
detecting wands, a police presence, and mandatory coat check,” the Supreme 
Court of the State of New York held that the defendants established prima 
facie that they had “reasonable” security measures in place and granted the 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to 
raise an issue of fact or establish that any “breach in the duty to provide 
security proximately caused plaintiff’s injury.”59  
II.   EXAMPLES OF EXISTING VENUE SECURITY LEGISLATION AND 
MODEL CODES 
Although many states already have legislation in place regarding 
crowd control, outdoor music festivals, and security staff requirements, 
venue security legislation often only applies to large venues or leaves 
decisions about sufficient standards to only a small number of officials. Such 
legislation is not expansive enough to actually keep performers or attendees 
safe. However, two model venue safety codes, The Event Safety Guide and 
The Purple Guide to Health, Safety and Welfare at Music and Other Events 
(the “Purple Guide”), give venue owners and promoters a helpful framework 
to use as a starting point when determining how to keep venues secure.  
A.  Existing Venue Security Legislation 
Several states have legislation in place regarding crowd control in 
public spaces. Critical aspects of such legislation include crowd control 
plans, specified numbers of security personnel required to be onsite during 
events, security guard training requirements, and safety requirements specific 
to outdoor music festivals. Per New York statute, the operators of “places of 
public assembly,” which are deemed to be locations which can hold at least 
5,000 people, must “establish a plan to be used for the purposes of crowd 
 
57. See Brian D. Caplan, Concert Venue and Promoter Liability for Violent Acts and 
Injuries at Concerts, 29 NYSBA ENT. ARTS & SPORTS L.J. 63, 65 (2018). 
58. Villa v. Paradise Theater Prods., Inc., 85 A.D.3d 402, 402–03 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2011). 
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control in the event of a riot.”60 Crowd control plans must be filed with the 
state emergency management office and local police and fire departments 
thirty days before the operator hosts an event.61 An “operator” is “the primary 
tenant of a place of public assembly or the person or persons responsible for 
the operation and management of said place of public assembly. If no 
operator of said place of public assembly can be ascertained, then the owner 
shall be deemed the operator.”62 Ohio’s legislature enacted a statue that 
forbids the sale of non-numbered tickets that do not correspond to specific 
seats for “live entertainment” performances and concerts held in venues with 
more than 3,000 tickets offered to the public, unless the hosting venues meet 
two criteria: the venues must have at least eight entrances or turnstiles, and 
the entrances must be “opened, maintained, and properly staffed at least one 
hour prior to the scheduled start of the performance.”63 However, the 
legislation does not provide any ascertainable standards to regulate security 
at those entrances, such as bag checks or pat-downs. 
Venue security guards are often in the best position to prevent a 
violent incident or lessen the impact of such an incident by maintaining 
security checks at venue entrances, isolating threats, or instigating an orderly 
evacuation of attendees. However, there are no federal regulations regarding 
the training of security guards, and the majority of states do not require 
individuals to undertake even 40 hours of security training to work in a 
security guard position.64 Although legislators introduced approximately 90 
bills regarding security officer training in 2015, none of those bills advanced 
through the legislative process.65  
Many states have enacted statutes that provide some regulation of 
security at live events, but the statutes are often not as expansive or helpful 
as possible because they do not contain clear factors to consider when 
responsible parties decide how many security personnel an event requires. 
For example, event venues in North Dakota are required by statute to allow 
a sheriff or chief of the peace officer to decide how many, if any, “deputy 
sheriffs, special officers, or licensed private security officers” should be 
onsite during a live event, at the expense of the concert promoter.66 However, 
while the North Dakota statute does not limit what constitutes a “music 
festival” by any set number of attendees, only “a musical performance by one 
or more groups held out of doors with the audience being present primarily 
for the purpose of listening to music,” the statute does limit what constitutes 
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a “public concert” to a “musical performance . . . held indoors . . . with the 
audience being present primarily for the purpose of listening to music and 
the location of such musical performance having a seating capacity of at least 
one thousand people.”67  
Many states have enacted legislation to regulate outdoor music 
festivals through the issuance of permits. However, these statutes often fail 
to specify security requirements needed for obtainment of a permit and often 
leave the decision of whether a promoter meets such requirements to the 
independent discretion of a designated local official. Many of the statutes do 
not even mention security requirements to prevent potential violent incidents. 
For example, Washington’s legislature enacted statutes specifically to 
regulate outdoor music festivals, but the legislative declaration specifies that 
the legislation is mainly designed to assist with “the enforcement of the 
existing laws and regulations on dangerous and narcotic drugs, indecent 
exposure, intoxicating liquor, and sanitation [that] has been rendered most 
difficult by the flagrant violations thereof by a large number of festival 
patrons,” rather than the prevention of violent incidents at outdoor music 
festivals.68 In Delaware, the Superintendent of the State may only issue a 
permit to host an outdoor music festival contingent upon the promoter’s 
showing of evidence that he or she has provided “adequate security for the 
safety of the spectators and their property.”69 However, the Delaware statute, 
like several other state statutes, specifies no guidelines to determine what 
measures actually constitute “adequate security.”70 
B. Existing Model Venue Safety Code Sources 
There are not many organizations dedicated to model venue safety 
codes. However, in the wake of rising venue safety and violence concerns, 
organizations dedicated to standardizing venue safety standards have begun 
to emerge. The Event Safety Alliance (ESA) is a non-profit association made 
up of members of the live event industry. It was incorporated in February 
2012 as a response to growing event safety concerns of event industry 
workers and modeled after event safety guidelines in the United Kingdom.71 
The organization’s goal is to promote “‘life safety first’ throughout all phases 
of event production and execution” and to help event professionals and 
attendees be “[e]mpowered, [s]afe, and [a]ware of the reasonably foreseeable 
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risks around them.”72 The ESA provides online entry-level event safety 
training programs and a “competency credential” program to provide safety 
certification for event workers.73 Such certification is not yet required in the 
United States.74 The ESA also provides live event and crowd safety 
symposiums to teach event professionals how to “understand the main risks 
of managing crowds,” “describe the phases of crowds and their psychology,” 
“conduct calculations for flow rates and density for people in crowded 
places,” “identify crowd behaviors in emergency situations and how to 
manage them,” and “manage safe pedestrian flows in crowded places during 
all phases of an event including emergencies.”75  
The ESA published its first Event Safety Guide in 2014 with the 
intention for it to be a “living document” to be “revise[d] and improve[d] as 
new approaches and technologies emerge.”76 The Event Safety Guide 
contains event-specific considerations on various sizes of events, including 
small events, arena events, trade shows, and all night events, as well as 
suggested guidelines for emergency planning, communication, and venue 
and site design.77 The Event Safety Guide recommends the creation of an 
event safety management plan during the early production phase of an event, 
which should include a plan for on-site first-aid and “arrangements with local 
hospitals,” a transportation management plan regarding vehicular routes 
inside the venue and public transportation arrangements and traffic 
management, and basic details of the event including venue layout details.78  
The Event Safety Guide also suggests the hiring of a safety 
coordinator for all events, with the exception of some small events where the 
event organizer “is competent to devise and apply protective measures 
themselves.”79 However, it notes that it is equally important for small-event 
organizers “to carry out a risk assessment for the event, to identify which 
hazards are of greatest significance” and that the important factor to consider 
is not the size of an event, but “the proportionate level and extent of facilities 
and safe management systems required to ensure the health, safety, and 
welfare of patrons, performers, and event staff.”80 The Guide recommends 
that for all types of events that require a safety coordinator, he or she should 
report directly to the event organizer to “eliminate the ‘filtering’ of 
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information by third parties . . . and that the coordinator assist with tasks 
including the:  
 
• Preparation and monitoring of site safety rules;  
• Liaison with contractors, event staff and the health and safety 
enforcement authority on site; 
• Checking of safety method statements and risk assessments; 
• Communication of safety information to contractors on site; 
• Monitoring and coordinating safety performance; and  
• Coordinating safety in response to a major incident.81 
 
The Guide also states that no one should assign the safety coordinator 
“other competing roles which would divert his or her attention during the 
event.”82 
The Event Safety Guide provides guidelines for “major incident 
(emergency) planning.”83 The Guide defines a “minor incident” as an 
undesired event, such as a low-level crime or minor injury that does not 
necessarily involve local authorities and is not “likely to escalate.”84 A 
“major incident” is defined as an incident that is “likely to require the 
implementation of special or non-routine arrangements and resources from 
one or more emergency services” and, if it occurred, would involve local 
authorities in the treatment of a large amount of deaths and rescues, 
responding to a large influx of public and news inquiries, and the need for 
“combined resources” of at least two emergency services.85 The Guide 
recommends that event organizers put together a flexible “major incident 
plan” that names key parties and identifies a pre-decided meeting spot for 
key decision makers in case of a major incident, evacuation paths and 
possible holding areas for attendees, ambulance loading areas, potential PA 
announcement scripts for emergency messages, and mechanisms and 
procedures to alert and warn attendees and the public of the incident.86  
The “major incident” section of the Event Safety Guide also 
discusses the importance of having a plan in place to understand and deal 
with issues that might impede evacuation paths, such as geographical 
features surrounding an outdoor event that might slow attendee movement, 
traffic backups, or transportation issues that strand attendees at the event 
site.87 The Guide stresses the importance of having a major incident plan 
approved “at the highest level possible rather than at only the operational 
level since high level decision makers will usually have the most 
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responsibility in an emergency major incident situation.88 However, it also 
notes the importance of communication of plans with guest services and 
security workers who work in shifts and are brought in to help quickly.89 The 
Guide suggests having “individual, team or group presentations, written 
instructions and training videos” prepared to efficiently and effectively 
inform these workers of the plan.90 
The Event Safety Guide also discusses the importance of effective 
communication with attendees and the media in case of a major incident. 
Since patrons are likely to document incidents immediately through social 
media, and the media will therefore likely inquire about a major incident 
quickly after it occurs, the Guide suggests designating a chief press officer to 
communicate with the media and clearly plan a “media rendezvous point.”91 
The Guide stresses the importance of both internal communication and 
communication to the public. Internal communication recommendations 
include a system to ensure that vendors, event staff, and guest members 
receive clear notification if the venue or event site requires evacuation.92  
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is an independent regulator 
in Great Britain that seeks to “prevent work-related death, injury and ill 
health.”93 It initially published the Purple Guide, a non-compulsory guide for 
event organizers “to manage health and safety, particularly at large-scale 
music and similar events.”94 The Events Industry Forum, an “informal 
organization” comprised of members who are “involved in representing the 
UK event industry or influencing the industry through training/education,” 
took over online publication of the Purple Guide in 2013 but still consults 
the HSE for “workplace health and safety” sections of the Purple Guide.95 
The Events Industry Forum hosts bi-annual meetings for event industry 
professionals to discuss topics affecting the industry such as policing and 
licensing.96 
Like the Event Safety Guide, the Purple Guide recommends having 
an event safety plan in place and notes that one must consider the “scale, type 
and scope of the event” to determine “what might go wrong and what 
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preventative measures are required.”97 The Purple Guide states that five steps 
are necessary for risk assessment: identification of the hazards, deciding who 
might be harmed and how, evaluation of the risks and precautions, recording 
and implementation of such findings, and a review of the assessment with 
updates as necessary.98 Event professionals are “only expected to tackle 
reasonably foreseeable hazards, taking account of reasonably foreseeable 
events and behavior.”99 Any settled methods for preventing risks should be 
“periodically checked and tested.”100 The Purple Guide also suggests a “clear 
understanding” of which individual is responsible for “safety matters” and 
how “specific safety duties will be allocated” for each event.101 It notes that 
signage should be large enough to view from a distance, attached to a fixture 
point, and should be “pictorial in content” whenever possible to assist event 
attendees that do not speak English.102 The Purple Guide notes that the 
“timely use of social media and the involvement of appropriate social media 
professionals should be included in public information provision whenever 
possible” to “ensure that messages are coordinated by the event rather than 
members of the public.”103 
III.   FIRE SAFETY LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS: A RESPONSE TO 
TRAGEDY 
One can draw parallels between venue security issues and fire safety 
issues in venues, which have gradually inspired changes in how venues are 
managed and monitored for fire safety across the United States. One deadly 
incident, the Station nightclub fire, instigated legislative action in Rhode 
Island, the state in which the fire occurred, and Massachusetts, a state with a 
large number of citizens affected by the incident, to prevent recurring fire 
tragedies. 104 The state legislatures’ responses to fire tragedies serve as a 
model for how all states can proactively respond to the danger of violent 
incidents at event venues and prevent unnecessary casualties and potential 
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litigation as venue owners, concert promoters, and the general public become 
more aware of the predictability of such incidents.105 
A. The Station Nightclub Fire 
On February 20, 2003, over 450 fans packed the Station, a nightclub 
with a capacity of 300, to attend a concert by the rock band Great White.106 
During the show, the band’s tour manager lit pyrotechnics behind the band 
as a part of the stage act. Sparks from the pyrotechnics caught fire, which 
spread due to polyurethane foam lining the ceiling and walls of the 
nightclub.107 Fire consumed the building within three minutes, killing 100 
concert attendees and injuring over 200 more.108 Jeffrey and Michael 
Derderian, the owners of the Station nightclub, maintained that they believed 
the polyurethane foam that lined the ceiling and walls for sound insulation 
was flame-resistant though it increased the flames.109 The polyurethane foam 
violated Rhode Island’s fire code at the time of the incident, but the club had 
never received a citation for the foam even though there had been several fire 
code inspections before the fire. In addition, the West Warwick fire inspector 
had recently doubled the club’s legal capacity before the fire.110 
The Station had three public exits, including two double doors that 
served as the main exits and two separate, three-foot wide doors that opened 
onto stairways outside of the building. However, the two double doors that 
served as the main exit were only accessible through one three-foot door.111 
Individuals typically take the same path to exit a building as they use to enter 
the building.112 As two-thirds of concert attendees flooded towards the main 
exit of the Station, people began to fall, and the main exit became blocked by 
fallen patrons. Several individuals were crushed during the evacuation.113  
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Although Rhode Island’s building code required sprinklers in all 
“places of public assembly occupied by more than three hundred people” in 
2003, there was no sprinkler system installed in the Station nightclub due to 
a grandfather clause in the legislation, which allowed for the exemption of 
buildings constructed before the legislation became effective. In addition, the 
Station’s employees had received no training on how to respond in the event 
of an emergency in the building.114 Witnesses even reported that venue 
security personnel turned away concert-goers who attempted to leave the 
building through the band door exit during the first minute of the fire because 
the exit was “for the band only.”115   
B. Model Code and Legislative Responses to the Station Nightclub 
Fire 
In the aftermath of the Station nightclub tragedy, avoidable issues 
within the existing Rhode Island fire code became apparent. The fire 
motivated both nonprofit fire safety organizations and state legislatures to 
update model fire codes and legislation to prevent future venue fires. The 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is a nonprofit organization 
dedicated to “eliminating death, injury, property and economic loss due to 
fire, electrical and related hazards.”116 The organization creates codes and 
standards to lower risks of fire by “establishing criteria for building, 
processing, design, service, and installation around the world.”117 The 
International Code Council (ICC) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to 
developing “model codes and standards used worldwide to construct safe, 
sustainable, affordable, and resilient structures.”118 States have adopted 
provisions from the model codes of both organizations into their own fire 
legislation. 
Both organizations used the Station nightclub fire as a catalyst to 
update their model fire codes. For example, before the Station nightclub fire, 
both organizations required automatic sprinkler systems to be in place for 
buildings with capacities over 300. However, neither code required buildings 
that existed before the provision to install the sprinklers. The Station 
nightclub fire demonstrated that such “grandfathering” provisions could have 
deadly consequences. The NFPA updated its code to require automatic 
sprinkler systems in all new nightclubs, bars with live entertainment, and 
places of assembly. Buildings that existed before the update were required to 
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install automatic sprinkler systems if the building capacity was above 100.119 
The ICC also updated its code to require automatic sprinkler systems in all 
venues with capacities of one hundred or with assembly areas of 5,000 square 
feet or larger.120  
In Rhode Island, the state in which the fire took place, the legislature 
passed the Comprehensive Fire Safety Act, which was based upon findings 
from the “Special Legislative Commission to Study All Aspects of Law & 
Regulation Concerning Pyrotechnic Displays and Fire Safety,” a seventeen-
person commission comprised of “legislators, fire service leaders (both labor 
and management), and public-sector representatives,” including “members 
of the state legislature, representatives of the state fire service, the State Fire 
Marshal, the Lt. Governor, the Adjutant General of the State, the Director of 
the Department of Public Health, the Executive Director of the State Fire 
Code Board of Appeal and Review, and representatives from the hospitality 
and real estate industries.”121  
The commission made multiple recommendations, such as 
mandatory sprinklers in clubs with capacities of 150 or greater; prohibition 
of fireworks in nightclubs and similar places along with strict regulation of 
fireworks in larger venues; requiring municipally connected fire alarms in 
“concentrated use places of assembly that are defined as ‘special amusement 
buildings’ . . . with occupancies of 150 or greater . . . by July 1, 2004”; giving 
power of entry for purposes of inspections to fire marshals “similar to those 
of other state and local inspectors”; making it a felony to violate requirements 
for “commercial and public use or display of commercial pyrotechnics”; and 
the allocation of “greater enforcement powers to fire marshals.”122 The 
Commission heard testimony from victims and families of deceased victims, 
fire and life safety experts, and other entertainment and hospitality industry 
members.123 The Commission recommended requiring the Fire Marshal to 
“make public the repeat and/or uncorrected fire safety code violations of all 
places of assembly that are special amusement buildings and to provide this 
information on a website” and to authorize a penalty of up to $5,000 for using 
“decorative or acoustical materials” that were not certified “consistent with 
NFPA requirements or such other requirements as may be established by the 
Fire Safety Code Board of Appeal and Review.”124  
The Comprehensive Fire Safety Act also provided for “the adoption 
and implementation of an up-to-date comprehensive system of codes for fire 
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safety.”125 It called for the fire marshal, along with a fire safety code board 
of appeal and review, the building code commission, and several other 
departments, to “prepare and approve” a “comprehensive plan setting forth 
goals and implementation measures for improving fire safety” that would be 
updated every five years.126 The legislation also called for the adoption of the 
National Fire Protection Association Uniform Fire Code and Life Safety 
Code in the State of Rhode Island and repealed “grandfather exemptions” for 
buildings which existed before the Act, the same exemptions which had 
allowed the Station nightclub to operate without the installation of a sprinkler 
system.127 However, the legislation did allow for “reasonable notice” of fire 
safety code violations and allowed for the establishment of a “timetable for 
compliance.”128  
The state of Massachusetts also had ties to the Station nightclub fire; 
one-third of the victims of the fire were citizens of the state.129 The state 
created a Task Force on Fire and Building Safety in April 2003, less than two 
months after the Station nightclub fire, which included the Secretary of 
Public Safety; the state Fire Marshal; state commissioners; fire chiefs from 
around the state; fire protection engineers and building officials; family 
members of fire victims; and insurance, hospitality, and entertainment 
industry representatives.130 In 2004, the governor of Massachusetts signed a 
bill requiring sprinklers in every “building or structure . . . of public 
assembly, with a capacity of 100 persons or more, that is designed or used 
for occupancy as a nightclub, dance hall, discotheque, bar, or for similar 
entertainment purposes” into law.131 Approximately nine years after the 
signing of the bill, the State Fire Marshal estimated that over 800 venues in 
Massachusetts had been retrofitted for sprinklers as required by the bill.132  
The state legislature vested the power to enact fire regulations in a 
Board of Fire Prevention. In addition, the Board was required to hold “public 
hearings on the first Thursday in May and October in each year, and at such 
other times as it may determine, on petitions for changes in the rules and 
regulations formulated by it.”133 If the Board believed it appropriate to make 
changes to the fire regulations after the hearings, it was to “appoint a day for 
a further hearing . . . [and] give notice thereof and of the changes proposed 
 
125. § 23-28.01-3.  
126. § 23-28.01-5; BARYLICK, supra note 112, at 67. 
127. § 23-28.01-5. 
128. § 23-28.1-7. 
129. Duval, supra note 104, at 31. 
130. Id. 
131. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 148 § 26G1/2 (West 2004); see also Deadliest U.S. 
Nightclub Fire Influences Safety Codes, Burn Care, CBS NEWS (Nov. 28, 2017, 10:43 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cocoanut-grove-boston-nightclub-fire-safety-codes-burn-
care/ [https://perma.cc/7W3S-ZVMY]. 
132. Patrick Johnson, 10 Years After the Station Nightclub Fire in R.I., Massachusetts 
Touts Safety Measures, MASSLIVE (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.masslive.com/news/
index.ssf/2013/02/10_years_after_rhode_islands_s.html [https://perma.cc/V75K-RX5N]. 
133. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 148 § 10 (West 2018).  
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by advertising in such newspapers . . . or professional publications . . . at least 
ten days before said hearing.”134 The Board of Fire Prevention enacted 
amendments to the Massachusetts Comprehensive Fire Safety Code, 
including the requirements that venues that fail a yearly fire safety inspection 
are not allowed to renew their liquor licenses135 and that “[a]ll nightclubs, 
dance halls, discotheques and bars with occupancies above 100 people must 
have certified crowd managers . . . . Every facility must have one crowd 
manager for every 250 occupants when the facility is open.”136 A crowd 
manager is to be certified every three years by completing an online course; 
his or her duties include responsibilities to: 
 
• Maintain clear paths of egress; 
• Assure that the facility does not exceed its occupant load limit; 
• Initiate a fire alarm if necessary and direct occupants to exits; 
• Assure that audible announcements are made before each 
program or performance notifying occupants of emergency exit 
locations; 
• Complete the Fire and Building Safety Checklist daily, before 
the facility opens; [and] 
• Keep completed checklists on file and available to fire and 
building code officials for at least one year. 
 
The sources of the Station nightclub fire, the polyurethane foam used 
to line the walls and ceiling of the club and the pyrotechnics set off during 
the show, were not permitted by either the NFPA, ICC, or the Rhode Island 
state fire codes at the time of the fire.137 The foam hung on the walls and 
ceiling for two years throughout at least two fire code inspections, but it was 
never cited as a violation.138 The devastation caused by the lack of code 
enforcement highlights the importance of sustainable enforcement strategies 
to ensure that code provisions are actually enforced. 
As the potential for violence within event venues and security 
procedural concerns become more apparent, it is helpful to examine how past 
fire-related legislation can be used as a model for event venue security 
legislation. The tragedy of the Station nightclub fire inspired legislation and 
regulations regarding fire safety within event venues and saved countless 
lives. Similar legislation and regulation regarding event venue security 
standards could help to prevent future instances of violence within event 
venues, help to save lives in violent situations, and give venue owners and 
 
134. Id. 
135. Johnson, supra note 132. 
136. See Crowd Managers, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/crowd-
managers [https://perma.cc/LQ25-78PT]. 
137. Tidwell, supra note 111, at 31. 
138. BARYLICK, supra note 112, at 103. 
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promoters clear standards to follow to prevent tort liability due to violent 
actions by third parties.  
IV.   PROPOSED MODEL VENUE SECURITY LEGISLATION 
 The actions of the Rhode Island and Massachusetts legislatures after 
the Station nightclub fire showed that, even if there is already legislation in 
place to lessen the dangers of injuries or casualties in event venues, such 
legislation can be expanded upon or improved if shown to be inadequate to 
prevent such dangers. After recent incidents of gun violence against fans and 
artists,139 disorderly and injurious evacuations, and public panic over 
perceived threats,140 such violent events will likely become more foreseeable, 
even at small venues, and leave venue owners and promoters open to tort 
liability.141 What follows is model legislation to address growing concerns 
over violence in event venues, influenced by legislative responses to the 
Station nightclub fire, existing venue safety state legislation, and model 
venue safety codes. 
Model Venue Safety Act 
(A) Definitions: 
(1)  In this section, “live entertainment” means a live 
musical or comedic performance by one or more performers 
held indoors and open to the public, with the audience being 
present primarily for the purpose of viewing 
performances,142 with a capacity of 100 or greater. 
(2) In this section, “outdoor music festival” means a 
live musical or comedic performance by one or more 
individuals or groups held out of doors and not in a 
permanent structure, with the audience being present 
primarily for the purpose of viewing performances, with a 
capacity of 100 or greater.143 
 
139. See Williams, supra note 10; see also Kreps, supra note 27. 
140. See Mervosh, supra note 33; see also Kreps, supra note 27. 
141. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 57, at 65 (noting that “the issues of venue and promoter 
liability will likely become the focus of increased judicial scrutiny. As violent acts are 
perpetrated, it will become more difficult for venues and promoters to disclaim liability by 
maintaining that such senseless acts of violence are not foreseeable.”).  
142. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 53-02-01 (West 2019); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2917.40 (West 2019). 
143. See PURPLE GUIDE, supra note 97, at 6; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 28, § 925(1) 
(West 2019). 
2020] VENUE SAFETY AND LIABILITY 463 
(B) The purpose of this section is to provide for the creation 
of a Board of Live Entertainment and Outdoor Music Festival 
Security (“The Board”). The powers necessary to implement the 
provisions of this act shall be vested in the state Department of Safety 
and Homeland Security. 144  
(1) The Board shall consist of fourteen members 
appointed by the governor for terms of six years each.145 
(a) Members of the board shall include an 
attorney, an insurance broker, a production 
manager, a current or former state fire marshal, a 
current or former employee of the International 
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, an 
administrative-level private security company 
employee, an employee of the National Weather 
Service, and three chiefs of police: one from a 
community with a population of less than twenty-
five thousand, one from a community with a 
population of more than twenty-five thousand but 
less than fifty thousand, and one from a community 
with a population over fifty thousand.  
(b) The remaining four members of the 
Board shall be appointed at the discretion of the 
governor.146 
(2) The Board shall, by one year from the date of the 
statute’s enactment, prepare and approve regulations setting 
forth goals and implementation measures for improving live 
entertainment and outdoor music festival security standards 
within the state.147 The comprehensive plan must include, 
but is not limited to: 
(a) Requirements for live entertainment and 
outdoor music festival promoters to create an event 
safety management plan. Outdoor music festival 
 
144. The official or office responsible for implementation of this statute will vary from 
state to state depending upon administrative structure. Cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22D § 4 
(West 2019). 
145. Cf. 22D § 4 (outlining how members of the Board of Fire Prevention shall be 
appointed and how long they may serve on the Board).  
146. This will allow for flexibility as security needs change and more areas where 
expertise is needed become apparent. 
147. Cf. 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-28.01-5(b) (West 2019) (setting a deadline for 
enactment of a comprehensive fire safety plan). 
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promoters shall submit such a plan to the local chief 
of police at least two weeks prior to the event. Live 
entertainment event venues shall submit such a plan 
to the local chief of police annually by the second 
Friday in January. Such plan shall include but not be 
limited to: identification of potential security 
hazards, evaluation of such risks and precautions the 
promoter or venue owner will take to prevent them 
from occurring, identification of key venue staff 
members including those listed in sections (d)(i)-
(ii), a meeting spot for key staff members to meet in 
case of a major incident, potential announcement 
scripts for emergency messages, identification of 
ambulance loading areas, and potential holding 
areas for attendees;148 
(b) Requirements regarding the number of 
security personnel required at a live entertainment 
venue or outdoor music festival based upon the 
number of expected event attendees; 
(c) Standard guidelines for bag checks and 
pat-downs for live entertainment events and outdoor 
music festivals; factors to be considered include, but 
are not limited to, the number of expected attendees 
and the number of entrances to the live 
entertainment or outdoor music festival venue 
which are open to event attendees; 
(d) Requirements for event staff members 
who must be designated and present at live 
entertainment events and outdoor music festivals at 
any time that the spaces are open to the public or 
ticketholders. Required staff members shall include, 
but are not limited to: 
(i) A Security Manager who shall 
oversee all security staff present at a live 
entertainment event or outdoor music 
festival, ensure that security staff perform 
any required bag checks or pat-downs as 
required by the Board, and make the 
decision and communicate with the Crowd 
 
148. See PURPLE GUIDE, supra note 97, at 2 (suggesting the need for a clear understanding 
of allocation of safety-related job duties). 
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Manager and performers if a performance 
must end due to an emergency situation.149 
(ii)  A Crowd Manager who shall 
maintain clear paths of egress, ensure that 
each exit has clear signage in place to 
identify it as such, ensure that the facility 
does not exceed its occupancy limit, and 
communicate with attendees if the 
performance must end or if the live 
entertainment venue or the outdoor music 
festival must evacuate due to an emergency. 
The Board shall create a Crowd Security 
Manager certification program.150 
(3) The Board shall hold public hearings on the first 
Fridays in January and June of each year, and at such other 
times as it may determine, regarding suggested changes in 
its rules and regulations. If the Board wishes to make 
changes to the regulations after such public hearings, it must 
give notice in entertainment industry professional 
publications at least ten days before a further hearing 
adopting such changes.151  
(4) The Board shall review and amend the plan as 
necessary every five years. The plan may be reviewed and 
amended periodically as needed.152 
(C) This section does not apply to privately held, non-
ticketed events or church services.153 
(D) A live entertainment or outdoor music festival venue 
owner’s failure to comply with this Act may result in the revocation 
of the venue’s liquor license and misdemeanor charges.154 
 
149. Id. 
150. See Crowd Managers, supra note 136. 
151. Cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 148 § 10 (West 2018) (designating dates for public 
hearings regarding proposed changes to fire safety regulations). 
152. Cf. 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-28.01-5(b) (West 2018) (requiring the review and 
possible amendment of Rhode Island’s comprehensive fire safety plan).  
153. Specific exceptions may vary based upon common types of events in each state. Cf. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.40(G)(2) (West 2019) (similar language noting exceptions to 
statute regarding seating and crowd control requirements). 
154. Enforcement provisions are vital to ensure that potentially lifesaving provisions are 
followed. See, e.g., Tidwell, supra note 111 (noting that, even though statutory law prohibited 
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V.   REASONING BEHIND THE MODEL VENUE SECURITY LEGISLATION 
Updated fire code legislation in Rhode Island and Massachusetts 
after the Station nightclub tragedy can serve as a model for how states may 
adjust or enact legislation to deal with potential violence at live event and 
outdoor music festival venues as such events become more foreseeable. Such 
legislation can help to ensure that individuals with expertise in live events 
and dealing with such threats have a say in new live event security 
regulations.  
A. Composition of the Board  
Updated fire code legislation in Rhode Island and Massachusetts 
after the Station nightclub tragedy and the model rules and membership 
composition of the ESA and the Events Industry Forum demonstrate the 
effectiveness of obtaining input from individuals with wide varieties of work 
experience to serve as Board members and implement the provisions of the 
Act. The Massachusetts legislature’s vesting of the power to enact fire 
regulations in a Board of Fire Prevention ensures that individuals with strong 
knowledge of fire safety are the designated individuals to make decisions on 
the best fire safety practices because the Board’s members must consist of 
“the state fire marshal . . . the commissioner of the Boston fire department 
. . . and 14 members to be appointed by the governor, for terms of six years 
each.”155 The fourteen appointed members are to include representatives who 
are the heads of fire departments from various communities, a member of the 
Massachusetts Fire Prevention Association, a fire protection engineer, a 
chemical engineer, a mechanical engineer, an electrical engineer, a chemist 
with fire testing experience, a representative of the public, a graduate chemist 
with fire testing experience, an inspector of wires with an electrician’s 
license, a blasting industry representative, a building inspector, and an 
electrical contractor.156  
Similarly, the Board of Directors, Advisory Council, and staff 
members of the ESA, the publisher of the Event Safety Guide, consist of 
members with diverse career and expertise backgrounds, including an 
attorney,157 insurance broker,158 production manager,159 event planner and 
 
the use of the polyurethane foam on the walls and ceiling of the Station nightclub, the venue 
passed at least two fire code inspections with the foam in place). 
155. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22D § 4 (West 2019). 
156. Id. 
157. Steve A. Adelman, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/
stevenadelman [https://perma.cc/B3HC-A4DC]. 
158. Scott Carroll, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/scott-
carroll [https://perma.cc/5C8K-652H]. 
159. Charlie Hernandez Sr., EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/
charlie-hernandez-sr [https://perma.cc/Z3CJ-GCV9]. 
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project manager,160 a former state fire marshal,161 employees of the 
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE), the National 
Weather Service, and other live event industry professionals.162 The ESA 
describes its advisory council members as having “diverse backgrounds, 
experiences, and points of view,” but a shared, united focus “to help the 
Event Safety Alliance better serve the needs of everyone working in or 
attending live events” while “setting the strategic vision for the organization, 
guiding . . . development of critical projects, and helping procure human and 
financial resources.”163 Such diverse backgrounds give the ESA team a broad 
range of expertise to consult when setting policies and editing the Event 
Safety Guide.  
Although the Event Safety Guide does not yet focus on specific 
suggestions for security screenings, the organizational structure provides 
another model164 for how individuals from varied backgrounds can use their 
expertise to address potential safety protocols from multiple perspectives and 
keep such protocols current as new safety threats become foreseeable. 
Similarly, the Events Industry Forum also consists of members involved in 
various aspects of the event industry in the United Kingdom who contribute 
to the model standards and policies expressed in the Purple Guide.165 
Like the Massachusetts Board of Fire Prevention and the ESA, 
section (B)(1) of the Model Venue Safety Act calls for individuals with 
diverse work experience and expertise within live event production, security, 
and other surrounding industries to form the Board of Live Entertainment 
and Outdoor Music Festival Security to address and anticipate safety issues 
from a broad variety of perspectives.  
B. Public Hearings, Review, and Amendment 
Section (B)(3) of the Model Venue Safety Act requires bi-annual 
public hearings for suggested changes to and comments regarding the 
Board’s regulations. Section (B)(4) requires the Board to review and, if 
needed, amend the regulations every five years. After the tragic Station 
nightclub fire, state legislatures reacted by updating their fire safety 
legislation to address shortcomings in prior legislation and included 
provisions to require regular review and updates to legislation and 
regulations. The Rhode Island Comprehensive Fire Safety Act must be 
 
160. Steve Lemon, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/steve-
lemon [https://perma.cc/9MA6-X7WE]. 
161. Donald C. Cooper, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/
donald-cooper [https://perma.cc/2NVE-H4S8]. 
162. Our Leadership, EVENT SAFETY ALL., https://www.eventsafetyalliance.org/our-
leadership/ [https://perma.cc/F2YT-VTHE]. 
163. Id. 
164. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 148 § 10 (West 2018). 
165. PURPLE GUIDE, supra note 94; EVENTS INDUSTRY F., supra note 95. 
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reviewed and updated every five years166 and the Massachusetts Board of 
Fire Prevention is required to hold bi-annual public hearings regarding 
petitions for changes in its regulations.167 Similarly, event professionals 
frequently reflect upon more expansive or effective security measures after a 
violent incident at a venue or festival.168 While the Model Venue Safety Act 
gives the Board the authority to review and amend its regulations at any time 
as needed, the required reviews every five years help to ensure that the 
regulations are proactive and not merely reactionary. Like the Event Safety 
Guide, which the ESA stated was intended to be a “living document” to be 
updated as “new approaches and technologies emerge” in event safety,169 the 
Board’s regulations should regularly evolve to address new security 
measures and potential dangers.  
C. Capacity 
The Model Venue Safety Act applies to all venues and outdoor music 
festivals open to the public with capacities of 100 or greater; it does not call 
for any grandfather exemptions for pre-existing venues. Requirements for 
venues to have high capacities before statutory regulation of security lessen 
the effectiveness of such legislative efforts. Recent violent incidents at live 
events demonstrate that even small-scale events are not immune from 
tragedy. The Alrosa Villa Nightclub, where a concertgoer shot and killed 
“Dimebag” Darrell Abbott onstage, had a capacity of 600; there were only 
250 individuals in attendance at the time of the shooting.170 The Plaza Live, 
where a concert attendee shot and killed musician Christina Grimmie during 
a meet and greet, has a general admission standing room capacity of 1,250, 
but the reserved seating capacity is 903; there were only 300 individuals in 
the crowd the night of Ms. Grimmie’s shooting.171  
Both venues accommodated capacities below the numbers set by 
many state statutes to require security personnel onsite or crowd control 
 
166. 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-28.01-5(b) (West 2019). 
167. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 148 § 10 (West 2018).  
168. For example, the aerial attack during the Route 91 Harvest Festival caused event 
and security industry professionals to consider more expansive avenues of outdoor music 
festival security. See, e.g., Dave Brooks, Las Vegas Shooting: Security Experts Explore New 
Safety Solutions, BILLBOARD (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/
magazine-feature/7989203/las-vegas-shooting-security-experts-new-safety-precautions 
[https://perma.cc/43P2-FJLN] (discussing how event professionals need “out-of-the-box 
ideas” to prevent situations like the aerial assault from happening again, including the use of 
hydraulically raised observation towers with SWAT team sharpshooters or “safety zone” 
barriers for attendees to hide behind in case of attacks).  
169. EVENT SAFETY ALL., supra note 76, at 3. 
170. Wilkinson, supra note 16. 
171. Ryan, supra note 9; Venue, THE PLAZA LIVE, https://www.plazaliveorlando.org/
venue-info [https://perma.cc/8LGV-K8VM]. 
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plans.172 In addition, statutory security requirements frequently leave the 
amount of security personnel needed at an event, or the decision of whether 
a concert promoter has an adequate security plan in place, to the discretion 
of authorized local officials without any statutory definition or description of 
what measures constitute adequate security.173 Florida, the state where Ms. 
Grimmie’s murder occurred, does not even have a statute in place requiring 
security guards at live events of any size.174  
Such statutory omissions are comparable to Rhode Island’s building 
code before the Station nightclub fire that required sprinklers in “places of 
public assembly occupied by more than three hundred people,” yet contained 
a grandfather clause allowing for the exemption of buildings constructed 
before the legislation became effective, so that there was no sprinkler system 
in the Station nightclub when fire consumed the building.175 The grandfather 
exemptions were repealed after the tragedy.176 Similarly, a year after the 
Station nightclub tragedy, the Massachusetts legislature passed a bill 
requiring sprinklers in every “building or structure . . . of public assembly, 
with a capacity of 100 persons or more, that is designed or used for 
occupancy as a nightclub, dance hall, discotheque, bar, or for similar 
entertainment purposes . . . .”177 Recent violent incidents at venues and 
outdoor music festivals of varying sizes demonstrate the need for safety 
legislation and regulations that apply to venues of varying sizes, but current 
state security legislation tends to focus on only large capacity venues. The 
Model Venue Safety Act aims to shift this focus to include smaller and mid-
size venues.  
D. Designation of Roles 
Section (B)(2)(d) of the Model Venue Safety Act requires the 
designation of a Security Manager and a Crowd Manager to be present at live 
entertainment events and outdoor music festivals. The Purple Guide notes 
the importance of a clear understanding of allocation of safety-related 
duties.178 The Event Safety Guide also recommends designating an 
 
172. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 53-02-01 (West 2019); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 
2104.001 (West 2019) (regulating only issuance of permits for outdoor music festivals with 
more than 5,000 attendees); see also N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 475(1)–(2) (McKinney 2019) 
(requiring crowd control plans for “places of public assembly,” which are deemed to be 
locations which can hold at least 5,000 attendees); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2917.40(B)–(D) 
(West 2019). 
173. See, e.g., § 53-02-08. 
174. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 493.6301 (West 2019). 
175. BARYLICK, supra note 112, at 103. 
176. 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-28.1-7 (West 2018). 
177. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 148 § 26G1/2 (West 2004); see also Deadliest U.S. 
Nightclub Fire Influences Safety Codes, Burn Care, CBS NEWS (Nov. 28, 2017, 10:43 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cocoanut-grove-boston-nightclub-fire-safety-codes-burn-
care/ [https://perma.cc/8MUK-GZYG]. 
178. PURPLE GUIDE, supra note 97, at 2. 
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individual, with no “other competing roles,” to coordinate safety-related 
matters, such as “monitoring and coordinating safety performance,” and 
“coordinating safety in response to a major incident.”179 The Security 
Manager required by the Model Venue Safety Act would take on such a role.  
Both The Event Safety Guide and the Purple Guide discuss the 
importance of effective communication with attendees and the need for 
designated individuals to communicate with the audience in case of an 
emergency.180 A perceived threat of violence can cause panic in event 
attendees and prompt actions that cause even more injuries than the actual 
threat itself.181 Therefore, there is a need for a designated individual tasked 
with communicating with the crowd in the case of an emergency or perceived 
emergency. For example, the Massachusetts statute calls for a trained crowd 
manager182 to perform duties including assuring that “audible 
announcements are made before each program or performance notifying 
occupants of emergency exit locations” and maintaining “clear paths of 
egress.”183 Although the Massachusetts crowd manager requirement is 
mainly in place for fire safety purposes, the crowd manager role could also 
be used to ensure communication and more orderly evacuation in case of 
violence or a threat of violence at a live event or music festival venue. While 
the Security Manager’s role would be primarily to monitor safety 
performance, the requirement of a separate Crowd Manager would help to 
ensure effective communication and lessen safety issues caused by crowd 
panic. In addition, while Section (D) of the Act contains an enforcement 
provision calling for sanctions if a live entertainment or outdoor music 
festival venue owner fails to comply with the requirements of the Act, both 
the Security Manager and Crowd Safety Manager could also help to ensure 
enforcement by monitoring safety performance at the venue.  
CONCLUSION 
As the number of yearly concert attendees expands and violent 
incidents in venues become more reasonably foreseeable to venue owners 
and concert promoters, state legislatures should take action to prevent future 
injuries or deaths at live events and give venue owners and concert promoters 
a clearer understanding of how to keep from breaching their duties to concert 
attendees. The actions of the Rhode Island and Massachusetts state 
legislatures after the tragic Station nightclub fire demonstrate how states can 
also facilitate the creation of standard venue security guidelines to prevent or 
alleviate the effects of future violent incidents in concert venues. Like the 
model fire code of the NFPA and the ICC, The Event Safety Guide and The 
 
179. EVENT SAFETY ALL., supra note 76, at 21. 
180. Id. at 76–83; PURPLE GUIDE, supra note 102. 
181. See, e.g., Mervosh, supra note 33; see also Southall & Winston, supra note 33. 
182. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 148 § 10 (West 2004).  
183. See Crowd Managers, supra note 136. 
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Purple Guide serve as useful models to supplement existing state statutes 
regarding venue security. Such existing statutes provide a good foundation 
to improve venue security guidelines. However, they do not contain 
sufficient standards to address recent concerns regarding violent incidents in 
venues.  
Legislative action to create a Board of Live Entertainment and 
Outdoor Music Festival Security would allow for professionals with 
expertise in event production, security, law, and other fields to combine their 
knowledge and insight and create more up-to-date guidelines regarding 
venue security. Such legislation would help to prevent unnecessary deaths 
and injuries and avert future litigation against venue owners and promoters. 
The Board’s ability to update security regulations would enable venue 
owners and promoters to properly protect attendees as threats evolve. 
Although every potential security threat cannot be anticipated, and security 
regulations will not stop every attempted violent act from taking place, 
legislation to regulate venue security guidelines would still likely prevent 
more violent incidents from occurring by giving venue owners and promoters 
a greater understanding of how to mitigate, and possibly prevent, such 
emergency situations. Although nothing can be done to fix prior security 
breaches and alleviate the pain caused by previous violent incidents, updated 
venue security legislation can help protect event attendees in the future and 
ensure that they return home safely.  
 
 
 
